Abstract. We give a categorical treatment, in the spirit of Baez and Fritz, of relative entropy for probability distributions defined on standard Borel spaces. We define a category called SbStat suitable for reasoning about statistical inference on standard Borel spaces. We define relative entropy as a functor into Lawvere's category [0, ∞] and we show convexity, lower semicontinuity and uniqueness.
Introduction
The inspiration for the present work comes from two recent developments. The first is the beginning of a categorical understanding of Bayesian inversion and learning [DG15, DDG16, CDDG17] the second is a categorical reconstruction of relative entropy [BFL11, BF14, Lei] . The present paper provides a categorical treatment of entropy in the spirit of Baez and Fritz in the setting of standard Borel spaces, thus setting the stage to explore the role of entropy in learning.
Recently there have been some exciting developments that bring some categorical insights to probability theory and specifically to learning theory. These are reported in some recent papers by Clerc, Dahlqvist, Danos and Garnier [DG15, DDG16, CDDG17] . The first of these papers showed how to view the Dirichlet distribution as a natural transformation thus opening the way to an understanding of higher-order probabilities, while the second gave a powerful framework for constructing several natural transformations. In [DG15] the hope was expressed that one could use these ideas to understand Bayesian inversion, a core concept in machine learning. In [CDDG17] this was realized in a remarkably novel way. These papers carry out their investigations in the setting of standard Borel spaces and are based on the Giry monad [Gir81, Law64] .
In [BFL11, BF14] a beautiful treatment of relative entropy is given in categorical terms. The basic idea is to understand entropy in terms of the results of experiments and observations. How much does one learn about a probabilistic situation by doing experiments and observing the results? A category is set up where the morphisms capture the interplay between the original space and the space of observations. In order to interpret the relative entropy as a functor they use Lawvere's category which consists of a single object and a morphism for every extended positive real number [Law73] .
Our contribution is to develop the theory of Baez et al. in the setting of standard Borel spaces; their work is carried out with finite sets. While the work of [BF14] gives a firm conceptual direction, it gives little guidance in the actual development of the mathematical theory. We had to redevelop the mathematical framework and find the right analogues for the concepts appropriate to the finite case.
Background
In this section we review some of the background. We assume that the reader is familiar with concepts from topology and measure theory as well as basic category theory. We have found books by Ash [Ash72] , Billingsley [Bil95] and Dudley [Dud89] to be useful.
We will use letters like X, Y, Z for measurable spaces and capital Greek letters like Σ, Λ, Ω for σ-algebras. We will use p, q, . . . for probability measures. Given (X, Σ) and (Y, Λ) and a measurable function f : X → Y and a probability measure p on (X, Σ) we obtain a measure on (Y, Λ) by p • f −1 ; this is called the pushforward measure or the image measure.
2.1. The Giry monad. We denote the category of measurable spaces and measurable functions by Mes. We recall the Giry [Gir81] functor Γ : Mes → Mes which maps each measurable space X to the space Γ(X) of probability measures over X. Let A ∈ Σ, we define ev A : Γ(X) → [0, 1] by ev A (p) = p(A). We endow Γ(X) with the smallest σ-algebra making all the ev's measurable. A morphism f : X → Y in Mes is mapped to Γ(f ) : Γ(X) → Γ(Y ) by Γ(f )(p) = p • f −1 . With the following natural transformations, this endofunctor is a monad: the Giry monad. The natural transformation η : I → Γ is given by η X (x) = δ x , the Dirac measure concentrated at x. The monad multiplication µ : Γ 2 → Γ is given by ∀A ∈ B(X), µ X (p)(A) :=
Γ(X)
ev A dp where p is a probability measure in Γ(Γ(X)) and ev A : Γ(X) → [0, 1] is the measurable function on Γ(X) defined by ev A (p) = p(A).
Even if
Mes is an interesting category in and of itself, the need for regular conditional probabilities forces us to restrict ourselves to a subcategory of standard Borel spaces.
2.2. Standard Borel spaces and disintegration. The Radon-Nikodym theorem is the main tool used to show the existence of conditional probability distributions, also called Markov kernels, see the discussion below. It is a very general theorem, but it does not give as strong regularity features as one might want. A stronger theorem is needed; this is the so-called disintegration theorem. It requires stronger hypotheses on the space on which the kernels are being defined. A category of spaces that satisfy these stronger hypotheses is the category of standard Borel spaces. In order to define standard Borel spaces, we must first define Polish spaces. We can now state a version of the disintegration theorem. The following is also known as Rohlin's disintegration theorem [Rok49] .
Theorem 2.3 (Disintegration). Let (X, p) and (Y, q) be two standard Borel spaces equipped with probability measures, where q is the pushforward measure q := p • f −1 for a Borel measurable function f : X → Y . Then, there exists a q-almost everywhere uniquely determined family of probability measures {p y } y∈Y on X such that
(2) p y is a probability measure on f −1 (y) for q-almost all y ∈ Y ;
h dp y dq.
The objects obtained are often called regular conditional probability distributions. One can find a crisp categorical formulation of disintegration in [CDDG17, Theorem 1].
2.3. The Kleisli category of Γ on StBor. It is well known that the Giry monad on Mes restricted to StBor admits the same monad structure. [Gir81] The Kleisli category of Γ has as objects standard Borel spaces and as morphisms maps from
which are measurable. Here B Y stands for the Borel sets of Y and Γ(Y ) has the σ-algebra described above. Now we can curry this to write it as h : X × B Y → [0, 1] or h(x, U ) where x is a point in X and U is a Borel set in Y . Written this way it is called a Markov kernel and one can view it as a transition probability function or conditional probability distribution given x. Composition of morphisms f : X → Y and g : Y → Z in the Kleisli category is given by the formula
For an arrow s : Y → Γ(X) in StBor, we write s y for s(y) or, in kernel form s(y, ·). For arrows t : Z → Γ(Y ) and s : Y → Γ(X) in StBor, we denote their Kleisli composition by
For standard Borel spaces equipped with a probability measure p, we sometimes omit the measure in the notation, i.e. we sometimes write X instead of (X, p).
We say a probability measure p is absolutely continuous with respect to another measure q on the same measurable space X, denoted by p ≪ q, if for all measurable sets B, q(B) = 0 implies that p(B) = 0.
We note that absolute continuity is preserved by Kleisli composition; the proof is straightforward. 
The categorical setting
In this section, following Baez and Fritz [BF14] (see also [BFL11] ) we describe the category FinStat which they use for their characterization of entropy on finite spaces. We then introduce the category SbStat which will be the arena for the generalization to standard Borel spaces.
Before doing so, we define the notion of coherence which will play an important role in what follows.
Definition 3.1. Given standard Borel spaces X and Y with probability measure p and q, respectively, a pair (f, s), f : (X, p) → (Y, q) and a measurable map s : Y → Γ(X), is said to be coherent when f is measure preserving, i.e., q = p • f −1 , and s y is a probability measure on f −1 (y) q-almost everywhere.
1 If in addition, p is absolutely continuous with respect to s• q, then we say that (f, s) is absolutely coherent.
Definition 3.2. The category FinStat has
• Objects : Pairs (X, p) where X is a finite set and p a probability measure on X.
• Morphisms : Hom(X, Y ) are all coherent pairs (f, s), f : X → Y and s : Y → Γ(X).
We compose arrows (f, s) :
We now leave the finite world for a more general one: the category SbStat. Definition 3.3. The category SbStat has
• Objects : Pairs (X, p) where X is a standard Borel space and p a probability measure on the Borel subsets of X.
1 Note that (f, s) being coherent is equivalent to ηY = Γ(f ) • s.
Following the graphical representation from [BF14] we represent composition as follows:
One can think of f as a measurement process from X to Y and of s as a hypothesis about X given an observation in Y . We say that a hypothesis s is optimal if p = s• q. We denote by FP the subcategory of SbStat consisting of the same objects, but with only those morphisms where the hypothesis is optimal. See [BFL11, BF14] and [Lei] for a discussion of these ideas in the finite case. Proof. We first show that the composition is coherent, i.e.,
It is sufficient to show that the following diagram commutes:
Using the hypothesis that η Z = Γ(g) • t and the fact that Id = µ • Γ(η), we get that the right-hand square commutes. The triangle commutes since it is the application of Γ to our hypothesis η Y = Γ(f ) • s and the left-hand square commutes because µ is a natural transformation. Therefore, the whole diagram commutes and we have thus shown the composition of coherent morphisms is also coherent.
Next, in addition, assume the pairs (f, s) and (g, t) are absolutely coherent. We show
We end this section by defining one more category; this one is due to Lawvere [Law73] . It is just the set [0, ∞] but endowed with categorical structure. This allows numerical values associated with morphisms to be regarded as functors. • Objects : One single object: •.
• Morphisms : For each element r ∈ [0, ∞], one arrow r : • → •.
Arrow composition is defined as addition in [0, ∞].
This is a remarkable category with monoidal closed structure and many other interesting properties.
Relative entropy functor
We recapitulate the definition of the relative entropy functor on FinStat from Baez and Fritz [BF14] and then extend it to SbStat.
Definition 4.1. The relative entropy functor RE f in is defined from FinStat to [0, ∞] as follows:
• On Objects : It maps every object (X, p) to •.
• On Morphisms : It maps a morphism (f, s) :
where
.
The convention from now on will be that ∞·c = c·∞ = ∞ for 0 < c ≤ ∞ and ∞·0 = 0·∞ = 0. We extend RE f in from FinStat to SbStat.
Definition 4.2. The relative entropy functor RE is defined from SbStat to [0, ∞] as follows:
• On Morphisms : Given a coherent morphism (f, s) :
, where
This quantity is also known as the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
We could have defined our category to have only absolutely coherent morphisms but it would make the comparison with the finite case more awkward as the finite case does not assume the morphisms to be absolutely coherent. The present definition leads to slightly awkward proofs where we have to consider absolutely coherent pairs and ordinary coherent pairs separately.
Clearly, RE restricts to RE f in on FinStat. If (f, s) is absolutely coherent, then p is absolutely continuous with respect to (s• q) and the Radon-Nikodym derivative is defined. The relative entropy is always non-negative [KL51] ; this is an easy consequence of Jensen's inequality. This shows that RE is defined everywhere in SbStat.
We will use the following notation occasionally:
It remains to show that RE is indeed a functor. That is, we want to show that
In order to do so, we will need the following two lemmas.
We just have to show that {s y } y∈Y satisfies the three properties implied by the disintegration theorem. We prove the third one; the first two being obvious.
(iii) : For every Borel-measurable function
Proof. Let's assume as a special case that h is the indicator function for a measurable set E ⊂ X. Then, we have
We have shown that it is true for any indicator function. By linearity, it is true for any simple function and then, by the monotone convergence theorem, it is true for all Borelmeasurable functions h :
Lemma 4.4. The relative entropy is preserved under pre-composition by optimal hypotheses, i.e., for any (g, t) :
Proof. Case I : (g, t) is absolutely coherent. Since (g, t) is absolutely coherent, so is
Because f is measure preserving, it is sufficient to show that the following functions on
By the Radon-Nikodym theorem, it is sufficient to show that for any E ⊂ X measurable set, we have
The following calculation establishes the above.
We get (4.2) by applying the disintegration theorem to f :
The equation (4.3) follows by using the fact that
• f is constant on f −1 (y) for every y. To obtain (4.4) we apply Lemma 4.3. To show (4.6) we use the fact that s y is a probability measure on f −1 (y). We get (4.7) by the definition of the Radon-Nikodym derivative and we finally establish (4.8) by the definition of Kleisli composition.
Case II : (g, t) is not absolutely coherent. We have RE((g, t)) = ∞. We show that (g • f, s• t) is not absolutely coherent, i.e., s• q is not absolutely continuous with respect to s• t• m.
Since, by hypothesis, q ≪ t• m doesn't hold, there exists a measurable set B ⊂ Y such that (t• m)(B) = 0 but q(B) > 0. We argue that (s• t• m)(f −1 (B)) = 0 and (s• q)(f −1 (B)) > 0. On one hand, we have
But on the other hand, since f is a measure preserving map from (X,
Case I : (f, s) and (g, t) are absolutely coherent. By Proposition 3.4, we have that
We get (4.10) by the chain rule for Radon-Nikodym derivatives and (4.13) by applying Lemma 4.4.
Case II : (g, t) is not absolutely coherent. We argue that (g • f, s• t) is not absolutely coherent. By hypothesis, q ≪ t• m doesn't hold, so there is a measurable set B ⊂ Y such that (t• m)(B) = 0 and q(B) > 0. We show that (s• t• m) f −1 (B) = 0 and p(f −1 (B)) > 0. On one hand, we have
but on the other hand, we have p(f −1 (B)) = q(B) > 0. Therefore
Case III : (f, s) is not absolutely coherent.
This case is not analogous to the previous case since the existence of a measurable set A ⊂ X such that (s• q)(A) = 0 and p(A) > 0 is surprisingly not enough to conclude that (s• t• m)(A) = 0.
By the hypothesis of (f, s) not being absolutely coherent, p ≪ s• q doesn't hold, so there is a measurable set A ⊂ X such that (s• q)(A) = 0 and p(A) > 0.
We partition A into
and we partition Y into
We argue that (s• t• m)(A 0 ) = 0 and p(A 0 ) > 0.
is disjoint from A 0 , so for all y ∈ B ǫ we have s y (A 0 ) = 0 because their support is disjoint from A 0 . On one hand, we thus have
On the other hand, since we have
By hypothesis, we have
so q(B ǫ ) = 0 and because f is measure preserving, we have p(f −1 (B ǫ )) = q(B ǫ ) = 0 as desired.
is not absolutely coherent, hence
This completes the proof of this case.
We have thus shown that RE is a well-defined functor from SbStat to [0, ∞].
4.1. Convex linearity. We show below that the relative entropy functor satisfies a convex linearity property. In [BF14] convexity looks familiar; here since we are performing "large" sums we have to express it as an integral. First we define a localized version of the relative entropy.
Note that Lemma 4.3 says that s y = (s• q) y q-almost everywhere. Thus, in the following there is no notational clash between the kernel s y and (s• q) y , the later being the disintegration of (s• q) along f .
Given an arrow (f, s) : (X, p) → (Y, q) in StBor and a point y ∈ Y , we denote by (f, s) y , the morphism (f, s) restricted to the pair of standard Borel spaces f −1 (y) and {y}. Explic-
where δ y is the one and only probability measure on {y}. 
We will sometimes refer to the relative entropy of (f, s) y as the local relative entropy of (f, s) at y. Before proving that RE is convex linear, we first prove the following lemma.
where f is a continuous function preserving the measure of both Borel probability measures p and p ′ . If p ≪ p ′ , then dpy dp ′ y is defined q-almost every y and dp y dp ′ y (x) = dp dp ′ (x) p ′ -almost everywhere.
Proof. For an arbitrary measurable function h : X → [0, ∞], by first applying the RadonNikodym theorem and then the disintegration theorem on the measurable function h dp dp ′ , we get X h dp = X h dp dp ′ dp =
h dp dp ′ dp
Hence, for q-almost every y, we must have dpy dp ′ y (x) = dp dp ′ (x) p ′ -almost everywhere.
Theorem 4.8 (Convex Linearity). The functor RE is convex linear, i.e., for every arrow
Proof. Case I : (f, s) is absolutely coherent.
We have RE((f, s)) = X log dp d(s• q) dp (4.14)
log dp d(s• q) dp y dq (4.15)
log dp y d(s• q) y dp y dq (4.16)
We get (4.15) by the disintegration theorem and (4.16) by applying Lemma 4.7.
Case II : (f, s) is not absolutely coherent. By the hypothesis of (f, s) not being absolutely coherent, there is a measurable set A ⊂ X such that (s• q)(A) = 0 and p(A) > 0. Applying lemma 4.3, on one hand we have
but on the other hand we have
Hence, the subset of Y on which p y ≪ (s• q) y doesn't hold contains a set of measure strictly greater than 0. Therefore,
4.2. Lower-semi-continuity. Recall that a sequence of probability measures p n converges strongly to p, denoted by p n → p, if for all measurable set E, one has lim n→∞ p n (E) = p(E).
Definition 4.9. A functor F from SbStat to [0, ∞] is lower semi-continuous if for every arrow (f, s) : (X, p) → (y, δ y ), whenever p n → p and s n → s, then
Recall that in [BF14] , lower semicontinuity was defined on FinStat as the following. 
Where convergence is just pointwise convergence.
We claim that a lower semi-continuous (as defined in Definition 4.9) functor F that vanishes on FP restricts to a lower semi-continuous functor on FinStat (as defined in Definition 4.10). To see this, note that, given a sequence of morphisms (f, s i ) : (X, q i ) → (Y, r i ) that converges pointwise to a morphism (f, s) : (X, q) → (Y, r), we can recover
Note that, on finite sets, converging pointwise is equivalent to strong convergence.
Theorem 4.11 (Lower semi-continuity). The functor RE is lower semi-continuous.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Pinsker [Pin60, Section 2.4].
Uniqueness
We now show that the relative entropy is, up to a multiplicative constant, the unique functor satisfying the conditions established so far. We first prove a crucial lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Let X be a Borel space equipped with probability measures p and q, if p ≪ q, then we can find a sequence of simple functions p * n on X such that for the sequence of probability measures p n (E) := E p * n dq, we have that p n and p agree on the elements of the partition on X induced by p * n and moreover, p n → p strongly.
Proof. We write I n,k for the interval [k2 −n , (k + 1)2 −n ) and I n,≤ for the interval [n, ∞).
Denote by K n the index set {0, 1, . . . , n2 n − 1, ≤} of k. We fix a version dp dq of the RadonNikodym such that dp dq < ∞ everywhere. We define a family of partitions and a family of simple functions as follows:
Every function induces a partition on the domain; if moreover the function is simple, the induced partition is finite.
We first note that p n and p agree on the elements of the partition induced by p * n :
Next, we prove the strong convergence of p n → p. We first show p * n → dp dq pointwise. Let x ∈ X. Pick N large enough such that dp dq (x) ≤ N . For a fixed integer n ≥ N , there is exactly one k n for which x ∈ X n,kn . On the one hand, we have k n 2 −n ≤ dp dq (x) ≤ (k n +1)2 −n on X n,kn . But on the other hand, by integrating over X n,kn and dividing everything by q(X n,kn ), we also have k n 2 −n ≤ p(X n,kn ) q(X n,kn ) ≤ (k n + 1)2 −n on X n,kn . We thus get pointwise convergence since we have p * n (x) − dp dq (x) = p (X n,kn ) q (X n,kn ) − dp dq (x) ≤ 2 −n for any n ≥ N.
From the above inequality and the choice of N , we note the following p * n (x) ≤ dp dq (x) + 2 −n ≤ dp dq (x) + 1, for x with dp dq (x) < n, p * n (x) = p(X n,≤ ) ≤ 1 ≤ dp dq (x) + 1, for x with dp dq (x) ≥ n.
So for all n, we can bound p * n (x) everywhere by the integrable function g(x) := dp dq (x) + 1. Given a measurable set E ⊂ X, we can thus apply Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem. We get
Before proving uniqueness, we recall the main theorem of Baez and Fritz [BF14] on FinStat.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose that a functor
is lower semicontinuous, convex linear and vanishes on FP. Then for some 0 ≤ c ≤ ∞ we have
We are now ready to extend this characterization to SbStat.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose that a functor
is lower semicontinuous, convex linear and vanishes on FP. Then for some 0 ≤ c ≤ ∞ we have F (f, s) = cRE(f, s) for all morphisms.
Proof. Since F satisfies all the above properties on FinStat, we can apply Theorem 5.2 in order to establish that F = cRE f in = cRE for all morphisms in the subcategory FinStat. We show that F extends uniquely to cRE on all morphisms in SbStat.
By convex linearity of F , for an arbitrary morphism (f, s) from (X, p) to (Y, q), we have
so F is totally described by its local relative entropies. It is thus sufficient to show F = cRE on an arbitrary morphism (f, s) : (X, p) → ({y}, δ y ). The case where p is not absolutely continuous with respect to s is straightforward, so let us assume p ≪ s.
We apply Lemma 5.1 with p and s to get the family of simple functions p * n and the corresponding family of partitions {X n,k }. We define π n as the function that maps x ∈ X n,k ′ to the element X n,k ′ ∈ {X n,k } k∈Kn . Denote by s πn the disintegration of s along π n and by s n the corresponding marginal. Note that since p n and p agree on every X n,k , p n is indeed the push-forward of p along π n , so we can identify p n to the corresponding marginal of p. Presented as diagrams, we have
From the above diagram and the hypothesis that F is a functor, we have the following inequality
Note that, on the one hand the disintegration of p n along π n at the point X n,k ′ ∈ {X n,k } is given by p n,π := p n (·)/p n (X n,k ′ ), but on the other hand, for any measurable set E ⊂ X, we also have
This means that p n,π is the disintegration of s along π n . Presented as diagrams, where we use f pn instead of f to indicate that the arrow leaves from the object (X, p n ) as opposed to (X, p), we have
But since F vanishes on FP, we have F ((π n , p n,π )) = 0. Combined with the fact that F is a functor, we get
By Lemma 5.1, we know that p n → p, in terms of our diagrams we have
Hence, combining (5.2) with the lower semicontinuity of F , we also have the inequality
Since (f n , s n ) is in FinStat, we must have F ((f n , s n )) = cRE((f n , s n )). Thus, combining (5.1) and (5.3), we get that
but so does cRE((f, s)). We also have lim sup s) ), as desired.
The relationship to forecasting
In this section we interpret our results by turning the characterization of relative entropy into statements about evaluating forecasters and proper scoring rules.
6.1. Probabilistic forecasting. One major purpose of learning from the past is to make better forecasts about the future. To provide suitable measures of the uncertainty associated to such predictions, forecasts take the form of probability distributions over future events, as opposed to single-valued forecasts. Making forecasts in the form of probability distributions is known as probabilistic forecasting; probabilistic forecasting has become routine in many applications, ranging from weather forecasting, sports betting and economic forecasting [GLPS03] . Note that in this context, a forecast about a system X is totally described by a probability measure q on X.
6.2. Scoring rules. Being able to quantify the"goodness" of forecasts is important; for instance when trying to decide which forecasters one should trust based on their forecasts' history. To that effect, loss (or reward) functions known as scoring rules have been introduced [Bri50, Goo52, Win69, GR07] . A scoring rule is a measurable map
The interpretation is that S(x, q) is the forecaster's loss when she predicted q ∈ Γ(X) and the event x ∈ X happened. We identify x ∈ X with δ x ∈ Γ(X) and overload the function S by considering its expected score:
If S(x, q) measures the goodness of the forecast q given the event x, then S(p, q) measures the goodness of the forecast q given a system X behaving according to p. The expected score associated to a forecast can thus be interpreted as a measure of the forecast's value in terms of being a good predictor for the given system.
Scoring rules that are minimized (in expectation) by reporting the true probability distribution are called proper scoring rules. Explicitly, a scoring rule S is proper when
If, in addition, S satisfies S(p, p) < S(p, q) whenever p = q, then the scoring rule S is called strictly proper. Under the very mild assumption that forecasters are minimizing their loss, strictly proper scoring rules become especially useful since they incentivize forecasters into revealing their true beliefs.
Restricting ourselves to proper scoring rules is a good step towards evaluating the "goodness" of forecasts, but such a restriction doesn't give us a unique verification score of "goodness". There are many strict proper scoring rules such as the Brier score [Bri50] , the ranked probability score [Eps69] , the spherical scoring rule [Bic07] , etc. and it's quite possible for two forecasts to be reciprocally better according to a different proper scoring rule each. Hence, asking for a scoring rule to be strictly proper is often not enough.
To further narrow the pool of "good" scoring rules, we look at two additional desiderata introduced by Benedetti [Ben10] . We consider a sequence P of n forecasts issued in different occasions. We denote by ǫ i the event that occurred at the i th occasion. The three desiderata are as follows:
Desideratum 1: The score S n should depend only on the probabilities assigned to the events that have occurred:
Desideratum 2: The score S n for a sequence (p 1 , . . . , p n ) of forecasts should be additive with respect to each single forecast, in the sense that by adding a new forecast occasion p n+1 , the score for the extended sequence is given by
Desideratum 3: The scoring rule S should be strictly proper.
The first desideratum is fundamental as the goodness of the fit between predictions and observations can only be measured by what is observed. In fact, we want two sequences of forecasts to have the same score whenever they differ only on probabilities assigned to events that never occur. Note that the first desideratum is also related to a concept known as locality [PDL + 12].
Requiring additivity implies that each single forecast affects the global score for the whole sequence in the same manner as any other, and any variation of its score produces an identical variation in the global one.
The last desideratum is critically important, as the use of improper scoring rules can lead to misguided inferences about predictive performance [Gne11] .
6.3. Connections to scoring rules. Consider the scenario of a forecaster making the prediction q about a system X which behaves according to p. We can capture this scenario in our framework as
Then, a scoring rule S becomes a map on morphisms whose target is a singleton:
There is a lot of freedom on how S could be extended to FinStat or SbStat. However, keeping in mind the "scoring rule interpretation" of S and asking for "goodness" properties, restricts the set of possible extensions.
Recall the 4 properties used in our characterization: convex linearity, functoriality, vanishing on FP and lower semicontinuity. We translate these properties in the context of forecasting and scoring rules. We show that most of these properties are direct consequences of the above desiderata. Moreover, we give a mechanism design interpretation to the properties used in our characterization by looking at the incentives they induce.
6.3.1. Convex linearity and desideratum 1. The first step is to extend S to a map that is defined on every morphism:
Such morphisms are totally described by q ∈ Γ(Y ) and the collection
and thus the value of the extended S is a function of {S(p y , s y )} y∈Y and q. If we interpret Y as a collection of hypothetical scenarios and s as a collection of conditional forecasts s y on X; each respectively conditioned on the fact that the scenario y has happened. Then, convex linearity amounts to extending S by taking the expected score of the conditional forecasts:
Consider the scenario where we have a sequence of two experiments. We remark that convex linearity makes the forecaster indifferent between:
• Waiting to update from the first experiment's results before casting their predictions about the second experiment;
• Casting their conditional forecasts before seeing the results from the first experiment.
Note that, as true Bayesians, the forecasters don't expect their conditional beliefs about the second experiment to change in a given direction; otherwise they would have updated them in that direction already. We also note that the convex linearity property satisfies the first desideratum: events that never happened are not taking into consideration as their expected score is 0.
Example 6.1. Let X := {H, T } correspond to the possible outcome of a biased coin whose behaviour (bias) is described by p ∈ Γ({H, T }). We consider the scenario where we independently flip the same biased coin twice and ask a forecaster for two conditional forecasts: a forecast s H predicated on having observed H on the first toss and a forecast s T predicated on having observed T on the first toss. We can capture the above scenario with The forecaster's score would then be given by
6.3.2. Functoriality and desideratum 2. Let's take a look at the second desideratum. Consider again the scenario where we have a sequence of two experiments and want the forecaster to give us a distribution on all pairs of events. We can consider two ways of asking the forecaster's predictions about the two experiments.
(1) To forecast the result of the first experiment and to give an exhaustive collection of forecasts for the second experiment conditioned on the first experiment's results. This scenario can be represented by 
The forecasters should be indifferent about how we ask for theirs predictions; explicitly, they should be indifferent between:
(1) Forecasting r about Y and independently forecasting s about X and;
(2) Forecasting s• r about X × Y.
In terms of our scoring rule S, this means
i.e., functoriality. Since ∞ − ∞ is not well defined, we must discard one end of [−∞, ∞].
Because we are interpreting the score of a forecaster as the forecaster's loss, we discard −∞ and thus restrict the codomain of S to (−∞, ∞].
6.3.3.
Vanishing on FP and desideratum 3. The last desideratum is about incentivizing forecasters into telling the truth and getting it right; we do so through proper scoring rules. It would thus be natural that the scoring rule S be strictly proper. If S is strictly proper, then it has a unique minimum m which is achieved when the forecaster is perfect 3 , i.e., the minimum should be achieved on FP. Since the result of composing perfect hypotheses is a perfect hypothesis, functoriality forces S to satisfy the equation m = m + m. Hence, m ∈ {0, ∞}. We discard ∞ as impractical for a minimum element as it is an absorbing element of (−∞, ∞]. Therefore, S achieves its unique minimum 0 on FP, i.e., S vanishes on FP. Since 0 is the minimum, the codomain of S can be restricted to [0, ∞].
6.3.4. Lower semicontinuity and its interpretation. Lower semicontinuity is not a direct consequence of a desideratum. It is however easily interpretable in the setting of scoring rules. For instance, if we can test a forecaster about a continuous space only through discretization of the continuous space, lower semicontinuity will ensure that the score we give to the forecaster on the continuous space is not worse than the score she is able to achieve at arbitrarily fine resolutions. Note that, as Baez and Fritz constructed in Proposition 15 [BF14] , there is a functor that satisfies the 3 previous properties, but is not a scalar multiple of relative entropy; so lower semicontinuity is essential for uniqueness to hold.
6.4. Aggregating predictions from many forecasters. We have already shown how to incentivize an agent into being honest and accurate, we now investigate how to deal with groups of forecasters.
One way to deal with a group of experts is to independently ask each of them for their predictions. One problem with that approach is that it is not clear what to do with the collection of forecasts; although simply averaging the forecasts has been empirically successful [Ell11] . Another problem is that if we are incentivizing forecasters through actual payments, then eliciting the predictions of many forecasters might be costly.
We remedy these issues by considering a solution proposed by Hanson [Han12] : we approach the forecasters sequentially instead of in batch. The idea is to approach the i th forecaster and ask her to make a prediction given the predictions made by the i − 1 first forecasters. Denoting the i th forecaster's prediction by q i , we penalize/reward the first forecaster by S(p, q 1 ) and for i ≥ 2 we penalize/reward the i th forecaster by S(p, q i−1 ) − S(p, q i ); we score a forecaster in terms of how much they have improved on the previous forecaster.
We consider the case where i = 2.
The situation for the first forecaster can again be captured by (X, p) ({y}, δ y ). Note that q is an element of Γ(X) and from the point of view of the second forecaster, q is a random measure. Let Q ∈ Γ (Γ(X)) be the true distribution on q and let P ∈ Γ (X × Γ(X)) be the true distribution on pairs of events in X and the first forecaster's predictions about X. The situation for the 2 nd forecaster, with and without access to the first forecaster's predictions, can be respectively captured by (X × Γ(X), P ) (Γ(X), Q) as a measure of how well the second forecaster can update predictions based upon the first forecaster's predictions; through taking higher (and higher) probabilities, one can thus assess "meta-properties" about a forecaster.
Since the collection of standard Borel spaces is closed under Γ, SbStat is well suited for investigating higher probabilities. We have shown that the uniqueness condition still holds in SbStat: this ensures us that RE is the only scoring rule that behaves in accordance with the above properties and desiderata. The above testifies the value of generalizing the characterization from finite spaces to standard Borel spaces.
Conclusions and Further Directions
As promised, we have given a categorial characterization of relative entropy on standard Borel spaces. This greatly broadens the scope of the original work by Baez et al. [BFL11, BF14] . However, the main motivation is to study the role of entropy arguments in machine learning. These appear in various ad-hoc ways in machine learning but with the appearance of the recent work by Danos and his co-workers [DG15, CDDG17, DDG16] we feel that we have the prospect of a mathematically well-defined framework on which to understand Bayesian inversion and its interplay with entropy. The most recent paper in this series [CDDG17] adopts a point-free approach introduced in [CDPP09, CDPP14] . It would be interesting to extend our definitions to a point-free situation.
